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Abstract
While a growing proportion of global food consumption is obtained through international trade,
there is an ongoing debate onwhether this increased reliance on trade beneﬁts or hinders food
security, and speciﬁcally, the ability of global food systems to absorb shocks due to local or regional
losses of production. This paper introduces amodel that simulates the short-term response to a food
supply shock originating in a single country, which is partly absorbed through decreases in domestic
reserves and consumption, and partly transmitted through the adjustment of trade ﬂows. By applying
themodel to publicly-available data for the cereals commodity group over a 17 year period, we ﬁnd
that differential outcomes of supply shocks simulated through this time period are driven not only by
the intensiﬁcation of trade, but as importantly by changes in the distribution of reserves. Our analysis
also identiﬁes countries where trade dependencymay accentuate the risk of food shortages from
foreign production shocks; such risk could be reduced by increasing domestic reserves or importing
food from a diversity of suppliers that possess their own reserves. This simulation-basedmodel
provides a framework to study the short-term, nonlinear and out-of-equilibrium response of trade
networks to supply shocks, and could be applied to speciﬁc scenarios of environmental or economic
perturbations.
1. Introduction
Country-scale food availability depends on domestic
production, reserves, and trade. About 24% of the
food that is consumed worldwide is available through
international trade (e.g., D’Odorico et al 2014); like-
wise, 24% of the global agricultural land (Weinzettel
et al 2013) and 23% of the freshwater resources used
for food production (D’Odorico and Rulli 2013) are
accessed through trade. Trade dependency has sub-
stantially increased in the last few decades and more
than doubled since the mid-1980s (Porkka et al 2013,
D’Odorico et al 2014) likely as a result of liberalization
and the associated removal of subsidies and trade
protections in developing countries (e.g., Shafaed-
din 2005).While international food trade increases the
variety of food products available to customers and
helps buffer the impact of local supply shocks (e.g.,
crop failures), the effect of the liberalization of trade
on economic development and food security in the
developing world is the subject of a vigorous debate
(Schanbacher 2010, Oliveira and Schneider 2016). It
has been argued that itmay allow for an inﬂux of cheap
subsidized food commodities from more developed
countries, thereby displacing smallholder farmers,
undermining rural livelihoods, and enhancing trade
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dependency in the global south (Shafaeddin 2005, De
Schutter 2014, Godar et al 2015), as some countries
increasingly rely on resources they do not control (e.g.,
Carr et al 2013, Suweis et al 2013).
Recent studies have stressed the environmental
implications of food trade in terms of loss of environ-
mental stewardship resulting from the tele-coupling
between agricultural production and consumer beha-
vior or market volatility (DeFries et al 2010, Schmitz
et al 2012, Meyfroidt et al 2013). Other studies hint at
the emergence of patterns of ecological unequal
exchange, whereby an unbalanced distribution and
ﬂow of resources and environmental impacts perpe-
tuates conditions of uneven economic development
around the world (e.g., Rice 2007, Martinez-
Alier 2014). In particular, the globalization of food
through trade has been associated with the exportation
and externalization of environmental impacts (Gallo-
way et al 2007, O’Bannon et al 2014), virtual water and
land trade (Hoekstra and Chapagain 2008, Fader
et al 2011), and the overall geographic disconnection
between consumers and the environment that supports
them (Carr et al 2013,MacDonald et al 2015).
In contrast with the number of studies on the eco-
nomic and environmental impacts of food trade, the
joint effects of economic and environmental changes
on the resilience of the global food system, i.e., its
capacity to meet food demand in spite of supply
shocks, remain poorly understood (D’Odorico
et al 2010, Prakash et al 2011, Fader et al 2013, Suweis
et al 2015). In conditions of food crisis, prices dramati-
cally increase, leaving the poor with no or limited
access to food (e.g., De Schutter 2014). Moreover, dur-
ing the recent food crises (e.g., in 2008 and 2011) the
governments of exporting countries have responded
to food price spikes by banning food exports, thereby
leaving trade dependent countries in a state of insecur-
ity (e.g., Fader et al 2013, Puma et al 2015). Export bans
increase the uncertainty and unreliability of the global
food markets, thereby eroding food security in trade-
dependent countries.
The impact of the intensiﬁcation of trade on food
security is difﬁcult to evaluate, particularly the short
term response of food systems to shocks in production
and the way such a response propagates through the
global trade network. These effects are hardly captured
by state-of the art economic models accounting for
changes in supply and price ﬂuctuations. In fact, such
models typically assume (general or partial) equili-
brium and market-clearing conditions (e.g., Hatﬁeld
et al 2013, Gouel 2013, Gouel and Jean 2015) that are
unlikely attained in the course of a food crisis when
hoarding and speculations occur while consumers
scramble and suppliers make short-term arrangements
(Piesse and Thirtle 2009, Headey 2011, Jones and Hil-
ler 2015). A shock to production induces a short-term
out-of-equilibrium condition in which shortfalls in
food supply are addressed through either local adjust-
ments or trade relationships. From a mass balance
point of view, this shock may be partly absorbed at the
country level by tapping on reserves or reducing
domestic consumption, and partly transmitted to other
countries as affected regions decrease their exports or
increase their imports. The outcome of these processes
cannot be predicted through a linear stability/reactivity
analysis (e.g., Suweis et al 2015), as large perturbations
cause nonlinear responses (such as threshold effects)
and the systemmaynot recover to its original state.
In this study, we develop a model that simulates
the propagation of a food supply shock through the
processes described above (changes in reserves, trade
and consumption) while preserving mass balance
at the country level. We share this approach with
other ‘cascading shock’ models applied to speciﬁc
food commodities (Puma et al 2015, Gephart
et al 2016), virtual water (Tamea et al 2016), industrial
sectors linked by input–output relationships (Con-
treras and Fagiolo 2014) and aggregate economic pro-
duction (Lee et al 2011). Our model differs from
previous work by its inclusion of food reserves, which
empirical research has shownmay play a major role in
the resilience of food systems (Fraser et al 2015).
We apply our model to a major food commodity
group (cereals) using publicly-available data on pro-
duction, trade and reserves over the last two decades.
We make parsimonious assumptions about country-
level response to shocks that are consistent with the
historical record, and simulate the propagation of
shocks under different versions of the trade network to
assess: (1) how food reserves and trade patterns inter-
act to increase or decrease exposure to supply shocks;
(2) how systemic changes in the cereals trade network
over the last 20 years affect the risk (frequency and
severity) of national food shortages following supply
shocks; and (3) which countries may bear a relatively
greater risk due to their position in the trade network.
2.Methods
2.1. Simulationmodel
The model simulates the impact of a shock to the
supply of some food commodity on the global trade
network for that commodity. The shock is initiated as
a drop in production in one country and propagates
through the network over multiple iterations of the
simulation loop (ﬁgure 1).
At each iteration, countries affected by a shock ﬁrst
tap into their reserves. When reserves are depleted,
countries absorb a fraction of the residual shock by
reducing domestic consumption, then reduce their
trade balance by decreasing exports and increasing
imports, with the impact spread to each trade link pro-
portionally to the volume on that link10. This
10
The exception to this rule, as illustrated in ﬁgure 1, is that
countries cannot import more from a partner country that already
reduced its trade balance following a shock, i.e.such trade links are
‘blocked’ from further increases.
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propagates the shock from affected countries to their
trade partners. Finally, any shock that could not be
propagated is absorbed by reducing domestic con-
sumption. These steps are repeated until all shocks
have been absorbed (see the supplementary materials
for a detailed description of themodel and table 1 for a
list of symbols and variables used in this paper).
As a portion of the shock is absorbed by domestic
reserves and consumption at each iteration, the resi-
dual shock monotonically decreases towards zero. To
avoid arbitrarily small shocks being propagated, coun-
tries will absorb (through consumption) any shock
smaller than a fractionα of their current supply; we set
α = 0.001% for all our simulations. With this adjust-
ment, the model converges within 10 iterations for all
parameter sets considered in this paper. At conv-
ergence, we verify that the mass balance equation:
D + D - D = D + DP I E R C is satisﬁed for
each country, and that the sum ofDR andDC over all
countries matches the magnitude of the initial shock
(bothwithin a tolerance level ofα).
The assumption that production shocks are absor-
bed ﬁrst by reserves is supported by the FAO com-
modity balance data, showing that interannual
changes in cereals production (DP) are most closely
associated with changes in R. In contrast, all compo-
nents of C, except animal feed, show little interannual
variation and little to no association withDP (see sup-
plementary table 3). Both E and I are more variable
than C over time, but these changes are mostly uncor-
related with DP , as trade dynamics are affected by
other factors than immediate changes in production.
We further discuss these assumptions and alternatives
at the end of the paper.
Figure 1. Simulationmodel ﬂow chart. See table 1 for a list of variables.
Table 1. List of variables and parameters of the shock propagation
model.
Symbol Description
Nc Number of countries in network
P Production by country
R Reserves by country
F Tradematrix ( Fjk= exports from country j to coun-
try k )
E Exports by country i.e. å Fk jk
I Imports by country i.e. å Fk kj
C Domestic consumption by country (for any use)
S Net supply, = + -S P I E
α Minimum threshold (as fraction of S) for a shock to be
propagated
fc Fraction of residual shock absorbed byC ifR is depleted
fr Fraction of actual reserves that are available to absorb
shocks
fp Magnitude of initial shock as a fraction of the affected
country’sP
3
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2.2.Data
We initialize our model with historical data on the
international trade in cereals. As a major component
of global food trade and food stocks, cereals provide a
natural starting point to study how food security is
impacted by the distribution of trade ﬂows and
reserves. By focusing our analysis on a commodity
group rather than a single commodity, we avoid the
need to consider substitution effects between func-
tionally-similar crops in that group.
We use cereals production and trade data (detailed
trade matrix exports) from the Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations’ online database
(FAOSTAT, faostat3.fao.org, data acquired in January
2016). Production and trade quantities of individual
primary and secondary commodities in the cereals
group are converted into kcal equivalents (FAO 2001)
and aggregated by country and year (see supplemen-
tary table 2 for the list of included crops and conver-
sion factors). We use population data from FAOSTAT
to subset the network so that only countries with a
population exceeding half a million people during the
period 1986–2011 are considered. We rectify the data
as described in Carr et al (2013) to account for the
merging and splitting of countries between years.
We obtain data on countries’ cereals reserves from
the Production, Supply and Distribution database of
the United States Department of Agriculture’s Foreign
Agricultural Service (USDA-PSD, apps.fas.usda.gov/
psdonline/, data acquired in October 2015). End-of-
year reserves for nine commodities (barley, corn,
millet, mixed grain, oats, rice, rye, sorghum and
wheat) were converted in kcal equivalents and aggre-
gated by country and year, and political entities were
rectiﬁed to match the FAO data above. While the
USDA-PSD data does not include some minor crops
covered by FAOSTAT (including buckwheat, fonio
and quinoa), those nine commodities account for over
90% of the total grain production reported by FAO-
STAT over the 25 year period. Note that since USDA-
PSD reports aggregated reserves for the European
Union (pre-1998) and EU-25 (1998 and after), we
divide these reserves between EU countries for each
year in proportion to their share of the EU cereals
production.
For model input, we average the cereals produc-
tion, reserves and trade over three ﬁve-year periods
(1994–1998, 2001–2005 and 2007–2011), which we
refer to by their median years (1996, 2003 and 2009).
The set of countries was constant over each period (no
merge/split event). The averaging process smooths
out annual perturbations in the data and ensures that
simulated shocks are applied to a typical state of the
network rather than, e.g., one where some countries
were already experiencing a shock.
The evolution of the cereals trade across these
three time periods shows a decrease of global reserves
and an increase in global trade, both expressed as a
fraction of total production (table 2).
To separate the effects of changes in reserves and
trade ﬂows on model outcomes, we perform two dif-
ferent scalings of the 1996 and 2003 reserves: (1) in the
R-scaled version, all countries’ reserves are scaled by a
common factor so that the ratio of global R to global P
matches that of 2009 (e.g., from table 2, the global R/P
ratio is 0.262 in 1996 and 0.192 in 2009, so the 1996 R-
scaling would multiply each country’s reserves by
0.192/0.262); (2) in the R/S-scaled version, each
country’s reserves are adjusted so that the ratio of R to
the net supply Smatches that of 2009 for that country
(e.g., the R/S ratio for Australia in 2009 is 0.435, so its
actual 1996 reserves would be replaced with 0.435
times its 1996 supply). Comparison between simula-
tions based on the original data and results from these
scaled versions allow us to identify the impact of (1)
changes in global reserves or (2) changes in the
distribution of these reserves among countries,
respectively.
2.3. Simulation parameters and response variables
In this study, we refer to a model run as a set of Nc
simulations, to observe the effect of a production
shock initiated (separately) at each country in the
dataset. For each run, we select one of the three time
periods, a speciﬁc scaling of the reserves (see above)
and three global parameters: the initial shock magni-
tude as a fraction of the target country’s production
( fp), the fraction of reserves that are available to absorb
a shock ( fr), as well as the fraction of a shock absorbed
by consumption after reserves are depleted ( fc, as
deﬁned in our model above). In general, we expect
<f 1r as the reported reserves include not only
strategic stocks, but also temporary storage of goods
along the supply chain.
For each model run, we report the number of
simulations where the initial shock was transmitted
(Ns), i.e.excluding those where the target country has
no production or has available reserves that exceed the
loss of production. We calculate the following sum-
mary metrics for each country: the number of hits, or
simulations where the country receives a shock (Nh);
the number of hits where domestic consumption is
affected (Nhc); the relative change in net supply (Dsrel)
and consumption (Dcrel) over all simulations; and the
evenness ( J) of impact across simulations (see below).
To compare the average impact of a shock across
countries and model runs, the total changes in supply
(DSj) and consumption (DCj) for a given country j are
scaled by its initial supply (S j0, ) and the simulation
parameter fp, i.e.ifD ( )Sjk is the impact on Sj of a shock
initiated at country k, then:
å åD = D D = D ( )( ) ( )s S
f S
c
C
f S
and , 1j
k j
k
j
j
k j
k
j
rel,
p 0,
rel,
p 0,
where the sum is taken over all simulations (initiated
at each country) in a given model run. These metrics
are always negative, so we usually refer to their
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magnitude, e.g.which countries receive a greater
shock or impact.
The average of Dsrel for all affected countries may
be less or greater than −1, depending on the covar-
iance between Dsrel and the initial supply S0. Starting
from equation (1), we obtain (E denotes the expected
value):
åD = D + D[ ] [ ] ( )
( )
( )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥E S E s E f S s f Scov , ,
2
k
k
rel p 0 rel p 0
åD = D - D[ ]
[ ] [ ]
( )
( )
( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
E s
E S
f E S E S
s S
1
cov , .
3
k
k
rel
p 0 0
rel 0
Since the mean supply equals the mean production,
both the numerator and the denominator of the ﬁrst
term on the right-hand side are equal in magnitude to
themean initial shock over simulations, and thus:
D = - - D[ ]
[ ]
( ) ( )E s
E S
s S1
1
cov , . 4rel
0
rel 0
Based on Pielou’s measure of community evenness in
ecology (Pielou 1966), Jmeasures the degree to which
the total impact on a country is spread out across
multiple simulations. It is calculated as:
åp p= - ( )J
N
1
log
log , 5j
k
kj kj
c
where pkj is the proportion of the total DSj that is due
to a shock initiated at country k:
åp =
D
D ( )
( )
( )
S
S
. 6kj
j
k
l j
l
Note that terms with p = 0kj are excluded from the
sum in equation (5). When the whole impact on
country j occurs in a single simulation, =J 0;j if it is
due equally to shocks originating from all countries,
Jj = 1. Since a single shock is spread out across many
countries through trade, we expect this metric to
increase with the number of links and trade volume in
the network.
2.4.Model implementation
We performed the simulations and all data processing
steps in R (R Core Team 2015), using the FAOSTAT
package (Kao et al 2015) to facilitate data acquisition
from the FAOSTAT database. The necessary code to
reproduce all results in this paper is available on
GitHub (http://github.com/pmarchand1/cereals-
network-shocks).
3. Results
3.1. Effects of global changes in the trade network
To compare simulation results across different ver-
sions of the trade network, we ﬁx the global simulation
parameters to fp = 0.2 (20% production decrease in
the country initiating the shock), fr = 0.5 (50% of
reserves available to buffer shocks) and fc = 0.01 (1%
of residual shock absorbed by consumption before it is
passed through trade). Our sensitivity analysis (in the
supplementary materials) shows that the number of
countries to which a shock spreads depends primarily
on the ratio of fp to fr, whereas the impact on domestic
consumption is most affected by fp (supplementary
table 1).
Our simulation results indicate that the most
recent trade network (2009) has a greater capacity to
absorb shocks compared with those of 1996 and 2003,
as evidenced by a decrease in hits by country (Nh,Nhc)
and a lesser impact on consumption (Dcrel) (table 3).
However, this pattern is largely driven by the distribu-
tion of reserves rather than increased trade. Despite
the total reserves being greater in 1996 and 2003—
which explains why the impactmetrics are even higher
when scaling these total reserves to 2009 levels—they
are less evenly distributed, with a few countries (such
as China) holding a very large proportion of their net
supply in reserve andmore countries having no repor-
ted reserves. By scaling relative reserves by country to
their 2009 values (R/S-scaling), we see that the num-
ber of hits by country monotonically increases over
time, with a small increase in themean evenness of the
impact across simulations, all factors consistent with
an increase of the number and volume of trade
connections.
While a more even distribution of reserves lessens
the average impact on domestic consumption, it
increases the average relative shock felt by countries
(Dsrel). To understand this pattern, we note that the
mean of Dsrel is greater than −1 for all our model
runs, which, based on equation (3), means that coun-
tries with a larger S0 receive a proportionally greater
impact from the shocks. This can be in turn related to
the structure of the cereals trade network. A few large
producers account for most of the net exports and
receivemore shocks due to their central position in the
network (i.e. as each of their many trade partners will
increase their imports when affected by a shock).
These main producers/exporters also tend to have
proportionately higher reserves, allowing them to
Table 2. Summary statistics of the cereals trade data for each time period considered in our analysis (Nc=number of coun-
tries in network, P= production,R= reserves, F= trade volume).
Med. year Nc åP (kcal) åR (kcal) # trade links åF (kcal) å åR P å åF P
1996 162 6.59× 1015 1.73× 1015 5985 7.93× 1014 0.262 0.120
2003 164 7.04× 1015 1.49× 1015 7580 9.88× 1014 0.211 0.140
2009 165 8.13× 1015 1.56× 1015 8358 1.18× 1015 0.192 0.146
5
Environ. Res. Lett. 11 (2016) 095009
absorb most of these shocks (see supplementary ﬁgure
2). The fact that themeanDsrel approaches−1 in 2009
shows that these discrepancies are becoming less
important. Once again, a large portion of the change
between 1996 and 2009 can be explained by the dis-
tribution of reserves, with the residual differences
(shown in the R/S-scaled version) reﬂecting the inten-
siﬁcation of trade.
Although the previous tables do not indicate the
standard deviations for the consumption impact
metrics (Nhc and Dcrel), their distributions are highly
skewed with most countries receiving little to no
impact. As such, we focus on themost impacted coun-
tries in the next section.
3.2. Country-level impacts
Figures 2 and 3 present the total impact on the supply
and consumption (respectively) of each country for
three different model runs: original 1996 data, 1996
data scaled with R/S ratios from 2009, and original
2009 data. Once again, results are aggregated over
simulated shocks initiated at each country. As stated in
the previous section, major exporters tend to absorb a
disproportionate share of shocks relative to their base
supply (ﬁgure 2), due to their large reserves and high
number of trade links. However, these large reserves
also ensure that the impact on domestic consumption
is negligible (ﬁgure 3). The larger impact on DS for
Argentina, Australia and Paraguay in 2009 (ﬁgure 2)
reﬂects the growing relative importance of their
exports. Some countries with low production and high
trade can also exhibit a high aggregate DS, such as
Oman, which increased both its reserves and trade
volume between 1996 and 2009.
Countries where the simulated shocks produce
substantial decreases in domestic consumption are
concentrated in a few regions: Central America, the
Sahel and East Africa, South and South-East Asia and
(in 1996 only) the former Soviet Union (ﬁgure 3). The
set of most affected countries is not sensitive to varia-
tion of the global simulation parameters fp, fr and fc
(supplementary table 2). Compared with the original
1996 data, simulations using the R/S-scaled reserves
led to smaller impacts to consumption overall. Chan-
ges in the trade network itself greatly reduced the DC
impact on many countries, including most of the for-
mer Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Sudan and Tanzania,
but led to larger impacts in others, notably in Central
America.
We can gain additional insights on these results by
separating the share of DC in a country due to the
shock initiated at that same country (internal shock)
and that which is due to shocks initiated at other coun-
tries (external shocks). Figure 4(a) compares the
impact on the 40 countries that experience a >1%
decrease in consumption due to an internal shock in at
least one model run. Using either the original or R/S-
scaled reserve levels, most countries lie above the 1:1
dividing line and are thus less impacted in the 2009
trade network. This is consistent with the additional
trade links and volume, which result in a greater capa-
city to transfer an internal shock to trade partners.
Conversely, a majority of the 24 countries receiv-
ing a substantial (>1% of S0) external shock are more
impacted under the 2009 trade network (ﬁgure 4(b)),
reﬂecting an increased reliance on food imports from
one or a few trade partners. A look at the speciﬁc exter-
nal shocks causing these DC show that they originate
from nine source countries (ﬁgure 5), with 14 of these
shocks—including the four greatest in magnitude—
caused by an initial production drop in the United
States. While the other target countries in the
graph experience this risk from one or two simula-
tions, the DC in Singapore is spread over ﬁve sources;
it also has the lowest aggregateDC , only slightly above
the 1% threshold.
Contrasting with the overall trend towards a more
globalized food trade network, our results show that
the vulnerabilities to external shocks occur mostly at a
regional scale, with American, South Asian / Indian
Ocean and East Asian clusters clearly visible in ﬁgure 5
(the link from the United States to Japan being a nota-
ble exception).
Table 3. Summary statistics by input data versionwith global parameters set at = =f f0.2, 0.5p r and =f 0.01c . Each row
aggregates results from a set of simulations, eachwith a shock originating in a different country. Ns is the number of simula-
tions where a shock is passed; Nh (resp., Nhc) is the number of times a countryʼs supply (resp., consumption) are affected
across simulations;Dsrel (resp.,Dcrel) is a relativemeasure of the total change in a countryʼs supply (resp., consumption)
across simulations; J is the evenness of impact between simulations.Means and standard deviations are calculated across
affected countries.
Year (version) Ns
Nh Dsrel J
Nhc Dcrel
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
1996 (original) 141 71.71 32.77 −0.82 0.59 0.30 0.16 17.67 −0.19
2003 (original) 139 85.71 28.39 −0.88 0.67 0.32 0.16 15.09 −0.13
2009 (original) 137 70.36 31.51 −1.00 0.72 0.34 0.15 7.02 −0.13
1996 (R-scaled) 148 74.93 34.12 −0.83 0.60 0.32 0.17 18.71 −0.23
2003 (R-scaled) 142 88.74 28.59 −0.88 0.67 0.33 0.16 15.94 −0.14
1996 (R S-scaled) 138 56.86 32.04 −0.91 0.55 0.31 0.15 5.93 −0.15
2003 (R S-scaled) 140 66.25 33.12 −0.95 0.67 0.33 0.14 6.34 −0.12
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4.Discussion and conclusion
In this study, we presented a dynamic simulation
model that complements previous approaches aimed
at understanding the effect of increasingly globalized
trade networks on the resilience of national food
supply systems. Initialized with historical food pro-
duction and trade data, the model describes how a
local production shock is propagated as countries use
their reserves and trade links to buffer the loss in food
supply.
Based on data for a speciﬁc commodity group—
cereals and cereal products—spanning a 17 year per-
iod from 1994 to 2011, we identiﬁed two global trends
affecting themodel’s dynamics: an increase in both the
number and volume of trade links (relative to produc-
tion), but also a decrease and a more even distribution
of global reserves (still relative to production). This lat-
ter point is particularly relevant to the ongoing discus-
sion on the importance of food stocks (Fraser
et al 2015, Laio et al 2016), as our results suggest that
the distribution of reserves matters more than their
aggregate quantity in terms of conferring resilience to
shocks. Trade and reserves also interact: as more
countries have the reserves to absorb production los-
ses or the capacity to importmore from countries with
such reserves, both trends contribute to reducing the
number and severity of cases where a local drop in
Figure 2.Total change in net supply (åDS, summed over independent simulations of shocks initiated at each country) as a fraction
of the affected country’s initial supply (S0), for three versions of the input data. Themiddle panel (R/S-scaled) uses the 1996
production and trade data, but scales the reserves tomatch the 2009 reserves/supply ratio. Global simulation parameters (see table 1)
are set at fp= 0.2, fr= 0.5 and fc= 0.01.
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production forces a decrease in domestic consump-
tion. However, a greater reliance on imports increases
the risk of critical food supply losses following a for-
eign shock, notably in the case of several Central
American and Caribbean countries that import grains
from theUnited States.
Since we simulated independent production
shocks of the same relative size originating in
each country, our aggregated results do not
account for variation in the probability of produc-
tion shocks across countries, or for the possibility
of simultaneous shocks in multiple countries.
The latter is of particular signiﬁcance as, accord-
ing to our analysis, the countries most at risk of
food shortages from external shocks tend to be
concentrated in regional blocks. Further research
on this topic could thus focus on developing
more realistic shock scenarios where the impact is
distributed across a region.
By focusing on the impact of global reserve dis-
tribution and trade network structure, we necessarily
ignore the particulars of each country’s domestic poli-
cies and trade agreements that may affect the national
response to food supply shocks. While our results
indicate the relative vulnerabilities of countries along
the dimensions considered in the model, this analysis
alone cannot serve as an assessment of the actual level
of food security in each country.
Figure 3.Total change in domestic consumption (åDC , summed over independent simulations of shocks initiated at each country)
as a fraction of the affected country’s initial supply (S0), for three versions of the input data. Themiddle panel (R/S-scaled) uses the
1996 production and trade data, but scales the reserves tomatch the 2009 reserves/supply ratio. Global simulation parameters (see
table 1) are set at fp= 0.2, fr= 0.5 and fc= 0.01.
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To avoid introducing too many adjustable para-
meters, we chose a parsimonious model of the agents’
(in this case, national economies) behavior: all coun-
tries are willing to spend the same proportion of their
reserves, and any shock transmitted to trade partners
is partitioned equally among all trade links. The latter
assumption is shared with other models of ‘contagion’
in economic networks (e.g., Lee et al 2011). A few
recent models of shock propagation in food commod-
ity networks (Puma et al 2015, Gephart et al 2016) use
a GDP-weighted partitioning, based on the assump-
tion that countries with a higher purchasing power
will have a greater ability to sustain their imports from
production-stressed countries. A key challenge in the
development and parametrization of more complex
model versions is the coarse, aggregate nature of avail-
able production and trade data, which limits our abil-
ity to follow the propagation of individual shocks in
the empirical record.
We can contrast our simulation-based approach
with previous studies aimed at evaluating the global
food trade network’s resilience to supply shocks.
Using an aggregated virtual water trade network, Sar-
tori and Schiavo (2015) analyzed the distribution of
historical supply shocks as well as changes in the net-
work structure over time, to support the thesis that the
global food supply became more stable as the reliance
of trade increased. However, the data alone does not
sufﬁce to isolate the effect of increased trade from that
of other trends present in the historical record, such as
a change in the distribution of food reserves. Our
model not only differentiates the effect of these two
trends, it also highlights the uneven impact of these
changes among the most vulnerable countries, show-
ing how relative risks may shift from one region to
another.
By shedding light on the complex interactions that
determine the link between trade and food security,
our model also suggests different paths through which
national economies can reduce the risk of food shorta-
ges, such as diversifying the sources of staple food sup-
plies and ensuring that trading partners have the
reserves to withstand a shock. We recognize however
that these country-level metrics constitute only one
Figure 4.Decrease in consumption (DC) as a fraction of initial net supply (S0) from (a) internal shocks (i.e. shockwas initiated at the
target country) and (b) external shocks (initiated at other countries), compared between the 1996 and 2009 trade networks. Two
outcomes are given in 1996 based onwhether the original reserves or those scaled to the 2009 reserves/supply ratio are used. Each plot
includes all countries where the decrease exceeded 1% in at least one simulation. Global simulation parameters (see table 1) are set at
fp= 0.2, fr= 0.5 and fc= 0.01. Country labels correspond to their ISO alpha-3 codes.
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dimension of food security, and that a more complete
assessment requires consideration of within-country
inequality in income, nutrition and access to food.
Furthermore, while patterns of trade-dependency can
be studied within the context of speciﬁc food com-
modity networks, their origin is intrinsically linked to
larger socio-environmental issues, including differ-
ences in access to water or land, the intensity of
their use (Fader et al 2016), and the geographical
distribution of pollution and other environmental
externalities.
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